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From project inception to continuous plant operation a stream of safety studies will be 
conducted on the process, and the identified hazards will have to be either eliminated or reduced 
to an acceptable risk level.  This risk level needs to be maintained at an acceptable level 
throughout the lifecycle of the plant.  As changes occur and time passes the safeguards and 
protection layers start getting disconnected from the intent of the safety studies.  This happens 
for many reasons but mainly because on proposing and implementing the layers of protection, 
the assumptions and intent made during the study are not explicitly attached to the specification 
of the equipment, instrumentation, or procedures.  This is aggravated when the 
recommendations coming out of a study are implemented in a different manner as the 
recommended one or a totally different solution is adopted.  Furthermore, the same equipment 
may be part of different safeguards in different studies. 
A Hazards Register would contain all the pertinent information related to the risks assessed 
during all the safety studies performed by the company, whether a PHA, or a MOC review, or 
an incident investigation.  The resolution of each hazard should be available in the Register, and 
not only the latest resolution but also its evolution (history) starting from the original study.  In 
order to be effective, the Hazards Register should be easily accessible, be capable of 
simultaneous use by all plant personnel, have appropriate security, and be fully and effortlessly 
searchable.   It should also automatically provide metrics that allow to manage outstanding 
recommendations and automatic recalculate relevant risk information (e.g., cumulative 
probability of failure on demand, pfd, from a LOPA study).  It should be able to import data 
from any type of safety study and to export all or part of the data for other uses (e.g., instrument 
specifications).  Such a system was successfully used in a very large project in which over 9,000 
safeguards and their justifications were managed.  At the end of the project the Hazards Register 








Managing the risks of a process is a task that starts at the conceptual stage and continues 
throughout the design, startup, operation of the process, and decommissioning of the plant.  
Thus, we have to continuously manage the risks through the life cycle of the process.  But the 
risks keep changing as we define in more detail the equipment and instrumentation of the 
process during the design, or introduce changes as a result of a desire for process improvement, 
or a change in operation.  The nature and severity of the risks will also change when we analyze 
them and implement measures for either avoiding them, or minimizing or mitigating them. 
Whichever method we use for safety studies, we will start with identifying the hazards, defining 
a potential cause for a process deviation that will make the hazard become an event, 
determining the consequence of that event, and then we will identify what safeguards exist to 
prevent or mitigate the consequence.  If we use risk-based process safety we will also want to 
describe the risk by assessing the severity of the consequence and the probability of that 
occurring given the identified safeguards.  During the analysis we will make assumptions and 
develop some logic that supports the description of the found risk.  We may want to reduce the 
risk and therefore we will recommend and implement additional safeguards.  So, there is a lot of 
information that lets us understand the risk which then allows us to control it. 
As time passes this information evolves and the basis for its creation becomes faint.  This may 
lead to adding, modifying or removing necessary safeguards adopted from safety studies, as the 
reason for these safeguards being there is hidden or forgotten.  Thus, a tool is needed for the 
long-term maintenance of the assumptions and logic for all the control schemes, instrumentation 
loops and equipment specs that make up the safety infrastructure of the plant. 
 
The Evolution of Risk Assessment in the Life Cycle of the Plant or a Project 
 
Any process design will undergo safety studies to determine the hazards of the process and the 
means to control them.  Most of the time this is done through PHAs using many different 
methodologies.  If the company practices risk-based process safety, this may be followed by a 
LOPA and/or a QRA, if the consequence level demands it.  When performing the PHA oft times 
recommendations are made to mitigate the risk resulting from a given cause that leads to a 
specific consequence (we will call it a cause-consequence pair or c-c pair for short). The 
recommendation will generally propose adding or modifying safeguards (or even changing 
equipment to make that part of the process inherently safer).  If a LOPA is performed in order to 
evaluate the risk in more detail, the same c-c pair may produce a more detailed safeguard, which 
can be an independent layer of protection (IPL) with its own rules [1, 2, 3].  Those rules will 
dictate, depending on the desired risk reduction and independence from other instrumented 
protections, a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) for the IPL.  We then specify instrumentation that is 
part of a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) and which gets documented in the SIS archives of 
the plant.  The same applies to a non-SIS layer of protection or safeguard, except that the 
documentation is in another place. This applies as well as to procedural (administrative) 
safeguards, where only the required actions will become a part of an SOP and their basis may 
not be documented in any place except for a PHA report.  Unless we document very well the 
reason behind a layer of protection (and are able to find it at any time), we are destined to defeat 
it at some point in time. 
 
 
A change in risk also occurs when a change in the plant occurs.  The change will go through the 
MOC process and obviously an MOC safety study will be performed.  In order to be successful, 
the safety study will need to review the hazards identified during the process’ PHA, and the 
protections that were identified at the time, plus the mitigations recommended by the PHA 
team.  In addition, the safety study will have to review any previous modifications of the 
equipment and instrumentation, that is, search the MOC database to see if any of the existing 
layers of protection are not impacted. 
 
An additional challenge is that recommendations made by any of the teams, be it a PHA or an 
MOC (or an incident investigation), sometimes doesn’t get executed as the team proposed, as a 
better solution may be implemented once there’s more time to think and come up with a 
potentially better design.  When this happens, chances are that the implementation will only 
refer to the PHA report, or MOC number, and there will be a disconnect between the cause of 
the event and the implemented solution.  It is very common to create a new document in order 
to track implementation of the recommendations and this document will increase the gap 
between the implementation and the understanding of why the recommendation was needed. 
 
The effect of all this is that, as time goes by, the process safety reason for a certain process 
configuration gets lost.  A new safety analysis may totally miss the underlying safety need for 
that configuration as the need may have been identified a couple of iterations before and it may 
not be obvious at the present time.  This gets complicated even more when there are interlocks 
that activate various valves (for example a plant shutdown) but one of the valves is also part of a 
control loop that has a different safety function (SIF) from that of the shutdown.  The plant 
shutdown may be obvious after some analysis, but the other SIF may not be that obvious.  At 
some point in time a decision could be made to reduce the SIL rating of the loop because it is 
unnecessary for the shutdown, but by doing this the risk reduction for the other safety function 
may be compromised. 
 
It all depends how the safety documentation and the process documentation are interrelated.  
The following documents would need to be consulted for a proper risk estimation in case of a 
change in the process: 
1. PHA report 
2. MOC database 
3. Safety study of the MOC (if not integrated into the MOC database) 
4. Cause and Effect Table 
5. Instrument list containing instrument specifications. 
6. Incident investigation reports if there had been any incidents in the plant. 
7. Action-tracking table to see if there are unimplemented safety recommendations. 
 
And, of course, up-to-date P&IDs that reflect all the actual control schemes and other 
protections, be it SIS, DCS, or other. 
 
All this information can be easily integrated in a Hazards Register, which is a dynamic database 
that can also serve as a tracking device for all safety recommendations.  The Hazards Register 
ought to also include a historical record of all the resolutions that were ever made with respect to 
 
safety studies or changes affecting safety systems.  Such a database was created and its 
capabilities are described below. 
 
The Hazards Register 
 
The Hazards Register is a database with all the causes and consequences that were ever 
identified in a plant, including its grass-roots design project.  These c-c pairs will have unique 
identifiers that will allow them to be tracked throughout the life cycle of the plant.  In order to 
avoid errors created by compilation of data, all the data is imported directly from most 
commonly used PHA/LOPA software, or from any spreadsheets used in safety studies.  The only 
required manual entries are the name, date and type of the source safety study (PHA, LOPA, 
MOC, etc.).  If desired, additional information can also be entered, such as study team 
composition, remarks, etc., without limitations. 
 
The data elements that the Hazards Register includes for each c-c pair are: 
 C-c unique identifier (created automatically on entering the data by importing or 
otherwise) 
 Source study name, type and date 
 System (e.g. Operating Unit, plant area) 
 Subsystem (e.g. Compressor system, Cold Box, Final Purification, etc.) 
 Process deviation/keyword used in PHA for the c-c pair 
 Consequence (Hazard) 
 Cause 
 Consequence severity level 
 Type of consequence severity (e.g. economic, safety, environmental, etc.) 
 Safeguards or IPLs 
 Frequency of initiating event (LOPA) 
 Frequency and type of enabling event (LOPA) 
 Frequency and type of modification event (LOPA) 
 PFD (Probability of Failure on Demand) for each IPL 
 Probability (calculated from PFDs or entered from Risk Matrix) 
 Risk (from risk matrix) 
 Mitigated risk 
 Reference (e.g. P&ID or other) 
 PFD gap 
 Recommendation or Action Plan 
 Owner (for tracking purposes) 
 Target date of implementation (for tracking purposes) 
 Resolution (the latest resolution for the item will show, but all the resolutions from the 
beginning can be seen by clicking a button) 
 New safeguards/IPLs resulting from recommendation(s) 
 SILs of each of the new IPLs 
 Final cumulative PFD (calculated automatically) 
 Documentation description 
 
 Status (open, closed, deferred, in progress, etc.).  Milestones are defined by the user.  Past 
due items, that is items not closed by target date, will show in red. 
 Comments 
 
That is, all the information contained in a PHA and LOPA plus some.  A main table (see Fig. 1) 
is a list of the c-c pairs with all the data above and is fully searchable.  If a c-c pair from a 
HAZOP, for example, which was imported into the program, was taken further into a LOPA 
which was then also imported into the program, the database will create a link between the two 
identical c-c pairs.  At the click of a button you can switch between one and the other.  All the 
data can be easily searched, filtered, sorted and exported.  Excel spreadsheets and Adobe 
Acrobat reports can be created at the click of a button. 
The main table will also automatically show statistics of all the table contents, both of those 
shown (after filtering) and of the total number of items.  The statistics will reflect the milestones 
previously selected by the company (e.g., open, closed, in progress, deferred, etc.). 
 
 




Each c-c pair can be closely examined by clicking on the item ID which will take you to a 
detailed view as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
  Figure 2.  Item’s Detailed View Showing Safeguards/IPLs 
 
In this view, all the safeguards/IPLs can be seen and SIL values assigned.  If a PFD has been 
entered, the program will calculate the cumulative (total event) PFD.  If an IPL’s PFD is 
changed, the cumulative PFD will be recalculated.  If a safeguard or IPL came from a 
recommendation, it will be marked so, and it’s possible to see the contribution of the 
recommendation to the total item’s risk. 
 
There are other views, of all the recommendations and actions taken for each recommendation 
(with dates and name of implementer), and of all the resolutions, which are the explanations of 
how item was finally resolved.  There’s a resolution for every item, even if a recommendation 
wasn’t made and even more important, if a recommendation was not followed upon.  Although 
the latest resolution is the one that will be shown in the main table, all the history of the item 
from day one is available by clicking on the history button.  Thus, the evolution of the reasoning 
of why the resolution stands as it is, is available, as well the justification for all the safeguards 
and IPLs that are part of the current process configuration.  When making a change, it will be 
immediately obvious why a certain protection is in place.  If a protection is removed or a new 
protection is added, the program will recalculate the risk. 
 
Another very useful part of the Register is a list of all the safeguards/IPLs with their PFDs and 
SIL values (Figure 3).  This list can be easily exported to Excel and serve as the basis for 
creating or checking the plant’s instrument list as well as inspecting and maintaining the Cause 
 
and Effect table.  Since it is fully searchable any instrument or device can be found, and its 
participation in more than one Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) at a time scrutinized. 
 
 
Figure 3.  List of Safeguards/IPLs 
 
In summary, the Hazards Register that was created maintains in one place all the hazards and 
related risks of the facility.  The basis and reasoning for resolving the hazards through time is 
available since when the first safety study was imported.  This is essentially in order not to forget 
the intent of an instrument or protection layer which could be later be changed, unintentionally 
increasing the risk of the facility.  Since it resides in a database with simultaneous access to all, 
and is fully searchable, all the data can be easily found and continually used to maintain a safe 
design throughout the life cycle of the plant. 
 
This Hazards Register was successful used in a very large EPC project ($4 billion) that lasted 
over three years.  The database contained about 2,300 c-c pairs and 9,000 safeguards/IPLs and it 
was to track resolution of all these items.  At the end of the project the data was incorporated in 
the new facility’s information.  The Register could be seamlessly transferred to the facility and 
continued to be used. 
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